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This paper looks broadly at the changing fortunes of the Chinese water frontier 
in Southern Vietnam over a 200 year period between the late seventeenth century and 
the end of the nineteenth century. Initially an area of sparse settlement, Chinese 
settlers, first Ming refugees and later waves of pirates, planters and traders moved into 
the Mekong Delta and south eastern Siam to create a vibrant and influential economic 
centre in the region. By the end of the nineteenth century these areas were largely 
backwaters of little more than subregional significance. Within the same 200-year 
period, however, the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia had increased by a 
phenomenal degree, and completely new centres of activity had been established.  
 The most important change had been the rise of new states and the spread of 
colonial rule in the nineteenth century. Much of the success of these economies was 
due in no small measure to the Chinese. We also argue that this success was at least 
partly built upon the base of the water frontier towns. Thus, cities such as 
Saigon/Cholon, Bangkok and most of all, Singapore, became the new centres of 
Chinese settlement in the region and took the beginning stages of economic 
development which originated in the Water Frontier to new levels. One task of this 
paper is to attempt to trace the continuities and also disjunctures between Chinese 
activities in the eighteenth century water frontier and its institutions with those that 
characterised the colonial cities of the nineteenth century. A further aim is to explain 
the significance of these trends. 
A key aspect of the water frontier, as a concept, is that it offers an internal 
version of the Chinese migration to Southeast Asia that is rooted in events that 
affected the migrants themselves. It also offers a more-or-less continuous thread of 
the history of that migration. Our aim here has been to avoid chopping up the 
narrative according to anachronistic, “nationalist” categories.1 By looking at specific 
trends, specific types of activity and at (where possible) specific networks, as they 
shifted and moved across the region over time. 
While we maintain that first evidence of key trends in the Chinese migration 
to the region were seen places such as the Mekong Delta and Southeast Siam, it is 
clear that the significance of this region diminished during the nineteenth century. The 
events connected with the formation of new states in the region during the late 
eighteenth century had a devastating impact on this region. This is perhaps one reason 
why later historians have neglected the history of the region. Not only were the 
human and physical resources of this area extensively exploited to fuel the military 
and political projects of both Taksin and Nguyen An, but the towns of the area were 
repeatedly devastated by waves of warring armies. Hatien, for example was sacked at 
                                                
1
 For example, Victor Purcell’s {Purcell, 1965 #406} valuable contribution to this area of study is 
structured according to the various nations of Southeast Asia, as they existed in 1960 or so. We find 
this approach problematic in that it deals with political categories that did not exist at the time the 
events discussed took place. At the same time, it ignores trends and developments which occurred 
across present day “national” boundaries. 
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least five or six times between 1777 and 1835, or almost once a decade. A look at the 
fortunes of one of the components of the water frontier will give some idea of the 
manner in which this shift took place.  
I would like to look first at the beginnings of the Water Frontier in one 
particular area, Southeast Siam, and then to explore the important economic trends 
and developments that made the region important. Next, I wish to look at the forces 
that undercut this economic growth and look at how they led to the next phases of the 
Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Following that I would like to shift to look 
quickly at the development of Singapore and to show how it can be considered a 
“successor” to the Water Frontier. Next, I would like to examine some of the changes 
which grew out of the new economic combinations created by Singapore, as a centre 
of Chinese economic life in the region. Finally, I would like to look at some of the 
networks which the Chinese based in Singapore began to create in Southeast Asia and 
in China itself. 
 
Southeast Siam in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
Southeast Siam, particularly the towns of Bang Plasoi (now Chonburi), 
Rayong, Chantaburi and Trat – all ranged along the coast of the Gulf of Siam between 
the eastern coast of the Bight of Bangkok and the Cambodian border – were a key 
area of the water frontier. Together with Hatien, founded in 1682, they seem to have 
been among the first settlement of Chinese labourers in Southeast Asia. Soon similar 
settlements began to appear in Borneo, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and the Riau-
Lingga Archipelago and Bangka. These developments marked a new and significant 
phase in the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. 
 Moving west from the Delta to south-eastern Siam, we find that settlements of 
Chinese agriculturalists were established in the towns of Trat (Tung Yai), Chantaburi 
and Chonburi (Bang Pla Soi) sometime in the early to mid-eighteenth century. At 
about the same time, we hear of tin mining settlements appearing at a number of 
places in the Malay Peninsula: Chumphon, Nakron Srithammarat and Songkhla in 
southern Siam; Kelantan and Trengganu in the Malay states on the east coast. On the 
west coast, there were Chinese tin miners in Perak and Phuket (Junk Ceylon). There 
were pepper and gambier planters on Bentan Island in the Riau Archipelago, gold 
miners in Pontianak, Sambas and other sites on the Kapuas River in western Borneo; 
pepper planters in Brunei; and tin miners in Bangka. All of these were established 
during the eighteenth century and all of them were characteristically commercial 
establishments. In general they had little or nothing to do with European trade or 
colonialism and were purely a part of the expansion of the mainland Chinese 
economy at the height of the Qing boom during the reign of the Chien Lung emperor. 
There were earlier Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia, but these were 
almost exclusively in important European colonial capitals (e.g. Melaka, Batavia, 
Manila, etc.) or else in Southeast Asian state capitals such as Ayutthaya, Hue, Kedah, 
Bentan and other significant port-polities in the region.  Except for a limited Chinese 
population of craftsmen, mariners and some urban labourers, they were primarily 
merchant settlements. The new development in the eighteenth century was marked by 
the establishment of colonies of Chinese labourers. These settlements were 
“economic” in nature in that they were rooted in commercial production for export. 
They need to produce commodities which were saleable in China. The key 
commodities in question at the outset, in the eighteenth century, were pepper, sugar, 
gambier, tin and gold.  
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 While there was no doubt a great deal of direct traffic between many of the 
larger colonial ports and China itself, it appears that much of the traffic from these 
new centres focussed at places like Hatien and other locations in Cochinchina where it 
was gathered for transhipment to China. Hatien was clearly an entrepot of 
considerable significance in the years between 1700 and 1770. It occupied a unique 
situation in Southeast Asia. According Sellers’ history of the place, it was founded in 
1682 by Mac Cuu, the leaders of a group of Ming refugees. (Sellers 1983) His 
original authority seems to have been the award of a gambling farm for the town from 
the king of Cambodia.  It was not long, however, before he sent tribute and obtained 
recognition from the Nguyen ruler of southern Vietnam or Dang Trong. 
 The town was of sufficient importance to have been sacked by Siamese forces 
when they attempted to invade Cambodia in 1720-22.  The English country trader, 
Alexander Hamilton reported that Siam sent 70,000 troops by both land and sea in an 
unsuccessful attempt to humble Cambodia. The force, however, was sufficient to 
destroy “Ponteamas”, the Thai name for Hatien. (Hamilton 1739: 97-105) The 
Siamese, however, did not hold the town for any length of time and apparently Mac 
Cuu was later recognized by the Thai ruler as a tributary lord and given the title of 
“Raja Seti”. Thus, despite owing allegiance to three different rulers, (or perhaps 
because of it) Mac Cuu, and later his son, Mac Tien Tu, were able to rule Hatien as a 
virtually autonomous city-state for much of the 18th century. 
 It was this perennial conflict between Siam and Vietnam that ultimately 
brought both Hatien and Chantaburi to grief. A comparison of their situations between 
the mid-18th and the early 19th centuries will show the changes which occurred... Key 
among them was the level of control exercised by the capital cities. In the case of 
Chantaburi and Southeast Siam it is clear that Bangkok wielded a far more intensive 
governance over the region than did Ayutthaya. 
Terwiel’s study of French sources from the 18th century shows that the 
Siamese court at Ayutthaya, even though it could command tribute from the governor, 
and apparently name, or at least legitimize the governors, had little direct influence on 
the settlement. In fact, there seem to have been regular outbreaks of disorder in the 
area. The French report an attempted revolt by a Cambodian married to a 
Cochinchinese woman in 1702. A Cochinchinese ship captain was arrested for piracy 
and plotting to seize the town of Chantaburi. The population of Christians, most of 
whom were Cochinchinese, constantly found themselves caught in the middle of these 
events. Despite the disruptions, the French priests felt that the members of their flock 
and other inhabitants of the town were better off than the commoners of Ayutthaya 
who were subject to heavy taxes and onerous corvée obligations. Although 
Ayutthayan authorities were involved in putting down the revolt in 1702, (the leaders 
were sent to be executed in the capital) the lack of comment in the chronicles may be 
explained by the general lack of Siamese control over the area. 
These reports show that Chantaburi was relatively free of control from 
Ayutthaya. Moreover, its population was highly diverse and it is probable that 
Siamese made up only a minority of the inhabitants of the place. There were 
Vietnamese, Malays, Cambodians and aboriginal peoples, but most importantly there 
were many Chinese. There were pirates, fishermen, and traders, but most important 
from my point of view were the large numbers of Chinese agriculturists, mostly 
pepper planters.  
 Reports from the nineteenth century indicate that during the 18th century the 
trade of the town was relatively free of royal taxes and regulation.  Both John 
Crawfurd and Finlayson (writing in the 1820s) received reports that the pepper trade 
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of Chantaburi was more profitable in the eighteenth century than in the Bangkok 
period, when control from the capital was far more rigorous. (Finlayson 1988) 
Crawfurd described the pepper output of Chantaburi and Trat, but also made the point 
that in his time virtually the entire crop was shipped directly to Bangkok under the 
king’s order and the local people received far less profit from it. 
The place is probably considerably improved since [the 17th century]; for both 
here and at Tung-yai, and some of the intermediate places, there are many 
Chinese settlers, chiefly engaged in the cultivation of pepper. Of this 
commodity, Chantabun is said to produce from thirty to forty thousand piculs 
yearly; and Tung-yai about ten thousand. Within the point called Lem-sing in 
the map, and at the mouth of the Chantabun river, there is said to be good 
shelter, and anchorage in five and six fathoms water.” [Crawfurd, 1987   (First 
Published 1828) #62: 440-1] 
 
 It may be safe to conclude that although Chantaburi was theoretically subject 
to Ayutthaya, it was largely autonomous. It was a thriving sea-port and economic 
centre during the eighteenth century, but relatively little of either its trade or the 
profits of the trade went directly to Ayutthaya. Where then, did they go? Within what 
system of exchange did Chantaburi function?  The answer to this question, I believe, 
concerns not only Chantaburi and the other nearby towns, including Bang Pla 
Soi/Chonburi, Rayong, and Tung Yai/Trat, as well as the more distant settlements of 
Kampot and Hatien to the east and the towns of Songklah/Singgora and Nakorn Sri 
Thammarat/Ligor on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. (Map 1) 
John Crawfurd made the point in the early 1820s, that the cities around the 
Gulf of Siam constituted a more or less integrated economic community. In fact, it 
may be sensible to extend the range of this community along the coast of the Malay 
Peninsula down to Riau and across the Karimata Straits to the coast of northern 
Borneo, including Sambas, Brunei, Tempasuk and Kudat. The latter three towns had 
links to the Sulu Archipelago and the Philippines and to the east coast of Borneo. It is 
important to connect this region with the remainder of maritime Southeast Asia. There 
had come to be an extensive chain of Chinese settlements stretching through the 
Malay world at this time. They formed a more-or-less continuous belt of colonies 
stretching from Cochinchina, along the Water Frontier, south to Trengganu, Riau, 
Sambas, Pontianak, Bangka, Palembang and Batavia. They also continued up the west 
coast of the Malay Peninsula to Perak, Kedah and Phuket. In the Malay world, there 
was a confluence of interests between the Chinese junk traders (many of them 
Hokkien), Chinese labourers (both Teochews or Hakkas) and the Bugis traders who 
dominated the local trade of the region as well as many of the Malay states. 
One of the important reasons for the general success this new wave of Chinese 
migration seems to have been the increased demand in China for certain products of 
the Nanyang. If we look only at the commodities which were being moved, we get 
some idea of these. In particular, it is clear that there was a strong demand in China 
for tin and gold. For agricultural products, the demand was for rice, pepper, sugar and 
gambier (used as a tanning agent and a dyestuff). In addition to these, there was a 
continuing and increased demand for the traditional products of the forests and seas of 
Southeast Asia (resins, tropical woods, incense, stick lac, rattans, birds’ feathers, 
birds’ nests, camphor, mother-of-pearl, pearls, corals, beche-de-mer, and the great 
variety of items that fell into the category of “straits produce.” 
For our purposes, the key commodities seem to have been tin, gold, pepper, 
gambier, sugar and rice. Except for the last item, all of them were the things that the 
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new migrants to the region were engaged in producing. In the case of rice, it was 
largely produced by natives of Siam, Cambodia and Cochinchina. In many cases, the 
import of rice, which was seen as a vital necessity by the Chinese government, was an 
important element in the trade. Cushman (Cushman 1993) has noted that one reason 
why the Chinese government was willing to tolerate trade in “luxury” items and non-
necessities was because the same ships brought rice. In fact, boats carrying rice were 
given special dispensations from taxes and other restrictions. Another important item, 
not often considered as an import, was ships. Chinese would bring artisans and ship 
builders to Siam and Cochinchina and build ships out of cheaper local timbers and 
then sail them back to China. 
Thus, by the middle of the eighteenth century, there was an active and 
growing commerce in commodities between Southeast Asia and China. This 
commerce was supported by this community of small trading ports around the Gulf of 
Siam, the coasts of Borneo and Sumatra. A key feature that would continue to 
characterize nineteenth century commerce was the fact that many of these 
commodities were produced by Chinese labour. There was, also, as a part of this, a 
trade in Chinese labour, which was another aspect of nineteenth century Asian 
commerce. Virtually all of the trade was managed by increasingly wealthy Chinese 
merchants largely in collaboration with native Southeast Asian monarchs. As a brief 
aside here, it is quite inaccurate to continue to accept the often-repeated generalization 
that “the Europeans brought the Chinese to Southeast Asia”. The process had already 
begun a century before most European colonies were established. 
One final point is that this commerce was further stimulated by its connections 
to other trading networks. On the one hand there were the Bugis/Malay trade routes 
stretching around the coast of Borneo, throughout the Java Sea, up through the Straits 
of Melaka and overlapping with the Chinese ports in the Gulf of Siam. In some cases 
the Bugis collaborated with Chinese merchants and planters in Riau. The other 
important network was that of the British country traders who frequented these ports 
selling Indian cloth, weapons, gunpowder and other goods in search of products that 
could be exchanged in China. They were instrumental in bringing a new and 
important product to the region after the 1760s, Indian opium. 
 
The Collapse of the Water Frontier 
A combination of factors, both economic and political eroded the importance 
of places like Hatien and Chantaburi. The rise of new and powerful states in the 
region challenged the politically unstable centres dominated by Chinese merchants 
and former pirates. The expansion of European colonialism in Southeast Asia and 
ultimately the establishment of a European presence in China brought further 
unmanageable changes as well as opportunities to the Chinese traders and labourers 
already established in the region. Finally, with the expansion of European, particularly 
British colonialism came the massive expansion of the opium trade which had the 
most radical impact on the entire Asian economy. 
While many of the trends established by this collection of communities 
continued into the nineteenth century, the major centres of activity were changed. The 
days of prosperity for places like Chantaburi and Hatien ended with the Burmese 
invasion of Siam in 1767.   With the collapse of the Siamese state, one small group of 
the defenders under the half-Chinese former governor of Tak fell back upon southeast 
Siam.  In January of 1767, Taksin and about 500 followers arrived in the southeast. 
Here they found a region unlike the rest of the country which had been devastated by 
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several years of warfare with the Burmese. The fields were cultivated, the granaries 
were full and the people still settled in their homes.  
According to Nidhi, there had already been a shift in dominance in the region. 
Provincial governors who had been appointed by Ayutthaya were no longer in control 
and new men, “natural leaders” as Nidhi calls them, had arisen to take control of the 
towns in this region. [Aeusrivongse, 1986 #196] There was little loyalty to the former 
rulers of Ayutthaya and thus, after a certain amount of intimidation, Taksin was able 
to bring these men into his following. Although he only had 500 followers when he 
arrived, he left Chantaburi in July 1767 with 5,000 men and about 100 ships. When he 
had arrived in Trat, he found a fleet of some 50 Chinese junks, which, after some 
fighting, he was able to commandeer. With these forces, he was able to return to the 
Chao Phraya valley and defeat the Burmese who had occupied Thonburi and thus 
establish his capital and declare himself king. 
It makes sense to assume that a large number of the people he recruited in 
Chantaburi and Trat were Teochew labourers and mariners. Although there is no 
specific evidence from eighteenth century sources that the pepper in Chantaburi and 
Trat was being grown by Teochews, it seems most likely. Travellers to the region in 
the early nineteenth century remarked on the large number of Teochew pepper 
planters in the area. One important source was the German missionary Karl Gutzlaff: 
 
The natives of China come in great numbers from Chaou-chow-fu, the most 
eastern part of Canton province. They are mostly agriculturalists; while 
another Canton tribe, called the Kih or Ka, consists chiefly of artisans. 
Emigrants from Tang-an (or Tung-an) district in Fuhkeen province are few, 
mostly sailors or merchants. Those from Hain-nan are chiefly pedlars and 
fishermen, and form  perhaps the poorest yet the most cheerful class. 
Language, as well as customs, derived from the Chaou-chow Chinese are 
prevalent throughout the country. [Gutzlaff, 1831 #198, pp 71-2] 
 
As Crawfurd noted, the production of pepper and other products from the 
region was an important asset to the Thai crown’s economy in the 1820s and 1830s. 
In addition to that Terweil has demonstrated that at the beginning of the 19th century, 
Chantaburi was a major source of tax revenue for the Siamese government. At this 
time, when much of the country was still experiencing considerable disruption 
because of war and the need to rebuild the economy, the southeast coastal region 
became an important prop to the Thai state.  
As a matter of fact, in 1809/10 Chanthaburi’s alcohol and gambling tax farms 
were the second or third largest in central Thailand, being surpassed only by 
Bangkok and the one containing Ayutthaya and seven other towns.  The 
amount of gambling and alcohol tax that a particular region’s tax farmer had  
to remit may not be directly correlated with the relative size of the population, 
but it may be taken as a rough indication of the number of migrant workers. 
(Terwiel 1989: 190) 
 
 
Pornpun Futrakul’s thoughtful remarks on the fate of certain provincial towns 
like Chantaburi are instructive in understand what happened to the town in the 
nineteenth century. Not only was it prosperous and an area of significant Chinese 
settlement, but it was on the invasion route between central Siam and Cambodia and 
Vietnam. Futrakul makes the point that such towns were often sacrificed in the 
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defense of the capital. The fate of such towns, which he styles as muang nasuk was 
quite dismal. The fact that Ayutthaya and Bangkok were… 
 
…in almost continuous warfare against their rivals, both neighboring and 
domestic had a great impact on the physical conditions of provincial towns. 
Over time, the protection of the main centre at the expense of provincial towns 
would have exhausted the latter both economically and physically. Naturally, 
frontier towns and towns with locations on the enemy’s approach routes to 
attack the centre were raided in most wars. With an obligation to supply their 
manpower to the capital in times of crisis, the defensive strength of these 
towns was diminished. Consequently, most peripheral towns on the enemy’s 
routes of approach were easily taken and destroyed every time the enemy 
launched an attack on the centre. But provincial towns also suffered the 
destruction by the centre itself. Repeatedly, captured huamuang were stormed 
by government forces seeking to regain them from the enemy. (Futrakul 
1989:60) 
 
Immediately following Taksin’s recruitment of troops from Chantaburi in 1767, the 
town was attacked and occupied by Mac Cuu from Hatien. A few years later, Taksin 
retaliated and retook the town and sacked Hatien. Although the economy of the region 
had recovered by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the place was once again on 
the line of march in 1833 when Rama III sent Chao Phraya Bodindecha to attack 
Vietnam and Cambodia with 100,000 troops. This initiated another 15 years of 
warfare between the two the Siamese and the Vietnamese.  
 This war was begun when the Thai tried to take advantage of Vietnamese 
preoccupation with the Le Van Khoi uprising in Saigon in that year. The fighting 
between the rebel Vietnamese and the forces of Minh Mang continued for a number 
of years and saw the utter devastation of the most prosperous towns of the former 
water frontier region in Cochinchina. Hatien, Chaudoc, Rachgia, and Saigon were all 
besieged and ultimately levelled in the fighting. In the process thousands of Chinese 
were massacred.  Although Saigon recovered a measure of its former prosperity, the 
other cities took much longer. Ultimately Saigon became the major economic centre 
for Cochinchina, and together with Cholon became the main centre of Chinese 
economic activity in the region. 
 A similar transfer of wealth and influence occurred in the case of Bangkok. 
Not only did it pull taxes and products from places like Chantaburi, but it also became 
the major centre of the trade and Chinese economic activity in Siam, leaving other 
towns as backwaters. In fact, the entire Siamese state and economy now became 
centred around the primary city of Bangkok, and it has remained so to the present 
time.  
 Another key development, perhaps the final nail in the coffin of the old Water 
Frontier towns was the establishment of the British port of Singapore. This town drew 
together the economy of the entire Water Frontier area. In my work on 19th century 
Johor, I have shown how Singapore was heir to the pepper and gambier economy of 
18th century Riau. Although  once relatively neglected by historians of Singapore, it is 
now generally recognized that the bulk of Singapore’s Chinese population was 
involved in pepper and gambier agriculture until the 1860s. From then until the end of 
the century, Singapore’s Chinese merchants grew wealthy from the pepper and 
gambier economy which had then spread to neighbouring Johor, back to Riau and 
Sumatra, to Borneo and to Negri Sembilan. (Trocki 1979) 
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 A key difference in the new economy built by Singapore was the role that 
opium now came to play in the exchanges taking place between labourers and 
capitalists in the region. Opium, most of it distributed from Singapore, now became a 
key element in the trade of Southeast Asia. Chinese capitalists in Singapore were able 
to use opium as capital in their acquisition of the commodities being produced by 
Chinese labour. In fact, during the nineteenth century, every community of Chinese 
labourers, whether miners, or planters was the opium concession or “farm” which was 
usually controlled by the capitalist to brought in the labourers, supplied them and held 
their credit-tickets. It was with the spread of the opium economy in the nineteenth 
century that the British were able to pre-empt the produce of Chinese labour and 
begin to redirect it to Europe. (Trocki 1990) 
 This did not happen immediately. For most of its early years, certainly until 
the 1840s, Singapore was reliant on the China trade, and that meant the economy 
which had been established by all of these small settlements of Chinese labourers and 
merchants around the Gulf of Siam, Borneo and the Straits of Melaka. Cushman has 
pointed out the importance of the Singapore/Siamese trade as well as the Singapore 
China trade. 
This is not to suggest that the junk trade was inconsequential, for the China-
Singapore and Siam-Singapore traffic made up two of its most lucrative 
branches.  Three quarters of the Singapore-Siam trade in 1833 was shipped in 
Chinese or Siamese vessels, while, of the total Singapore-China trade in 1835, 
almost one half was carried by junk. This trade was so critical, in fact, that a 
decrease in the number of Chinese and Siamese junks calling at Singapore 
during the 1832-1833 season was directly responsible for the stagnation of the 
entire market…The total value of the Singapore-Siam trade in July 21, 1831 to 
Oct. 14, 1833, was $462,973.  Square-rigged vessel carried $128,506 and 
$334,467 was carried by Siamese or Chinese junks. (Cushman 1993: 72) 
 
Nonetheless, as Cushman and Wong Lin Ken have both pointed out, there was 
a major decline in the junk trade to Southeast Asia in the 1840s, which was now 
challenged by square-rigged ships. (Wong 1960; Cushman 1993) It is important to 
understand, however, that not all of these European-style ships were owned by 
Europeans. Many of them were, in fact, owned by Chinese merchants, particularly 
those based in the colonial ports of the Straits. In later years, Chinese merchants also 
acquired steamships as rapidly as they became available in the region. Even when 
ships were owned by European merchants or by major shipping lines, many of the 
consignees were Chinese. Much of the coolie trade between Hong Kong and 
Australia, Hawaii and California was carried in European vessels, but the contractors 
and organizers were Chinese. 
 
Opium Farms and Chinese Networks 
 From the time of the Water Frontier to the early twentieth century, an 
important aspect of Chinese commerce in Southeast Asia was the networks created 
among merchants based in various port cities. A quick glance at the business interests 
of the many merchants mentioned in the pages of Song Ong Siang’s book shows that 
many of the larger merchants were involved in businesses in Bangkok, Saigon, Hong 
Kong, Batavia and Manila.(Song 1923) I think that it is probable that Singapore and 
Penang merchants played prominent roles in spreading their particular networks, 
particularly those of the Hokkien Chinese. This, after all is what I started wanted to 
talk about in the first place.  
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 It seems clear that as soon as Singapore was established, the port began to 
draw merchants from both Melaka and Penang. As they established themselves in 
Singapore, these merchants, most of them Hokkien and/or Straits-born Babas quickly 
began to expand their networks to the rest of Southeast Asia and the China coast. 
Their ability to speak English and to deal with European merchants gave them a key 
advantage in these other ports. Alistair Lamb quoted a British source on meeting a 
Singapore Chinese translator during his mission to Hue. 
On Tuesday the 4th [Sept 1855], I landed with Mr. Brownsdon at 5 in the 
morning, and found the kung kwan (the public meeting hall) somewhat more 
dressed than usual. The Kea-ying Chow man was seen no more, and in his 
stead two linguists sent down by the Governor General were in attendance, 
These men were Singaporeans and could spell English, but although, 
pronouncing some words with comparative distinctness, they did not on the 
whole speak the language as intelligibly as a Canton servant of any practice. 
The senior of the two, Yeun, said that the Governor General was certain to 
come, but that he must read Sir J. Bowring’s letter before it could go 
forward.(Lamb 1970: 315) 
 
Carl Smith notes that upon the foundation of Hong Kong, a number of the 
earliest Chinese settlers were Baba Chinese from Singapore and Penang. (Smith 
1985)Tan Kim Ching was not the only Singapore merchant who owned rice mills in 
Bangkok and Saigon. Of particular interest to me are the three brothers surnamed Tan, 
who were born in Singapore and were connected to some of the more prominent 
Melaka families.  
Tan Keng Seng, Tan Keng Hoon and Tan Keng Ho emerged as some of the 
most important Chinese merchants in Saigon during the 1860s and 1870s. Tan Keng 
Seng was styled the “Mayor of Saigon” in 1862. The firm of the three brothers was 
located in the Quai de Commerce and they were listed in the directory as “contractors 
to the government”. Together with another Singaporean, Ngan Wee, otherwise known 
by his “chop” Banhap, they held the Saigon, Cochinchinese and Cambodian opium 
farms from about 1863 to 1881. Their network of opium farming concessions in 1879-
1880 was one of the most formidable in Asia. 
According to a Hong Kong newspaper Tan Keng Seng and his friends held the 
Singapore, Saigon and Hong Kong opium farms all at the same time. Although there 
is no evidence in Singapore sources that Tan Keng Seng was involved in the farming 
syndicate, it does appear that he had a close connection with Cheang Hong Lim, the 
major Hokkien member of the Singapore farming syndicate in that year. Cheang was 
also an investor in the Hong Kong opium syndicate in 1879 along with Keng Seng 
and Banhap, so there was obviously a connection.  
The Tan family was closely linked to other Straits-born families in Singapore. 
The daughter of Tan Keng Hoon, Tan Yean Neo, was married to Ang Teow Guan, the 
son of Ang Kim Cheak. The latter  was the son of Ang Choon Seng who was born in 
Melaka in 1805 and came to Singapore "at an early age, he started business in Philip 
Street under the chop Chin Seng as commission agent and provision merchant.  He 
owned two schooners, Patah Salam and Kong Kek, trading to Saigon and Bangkok. 
When he died in 1852, Kim Cheak took over the business. Thus, we should assume 
that the link between the Ang family and the Tan family included dealings in Saigon 
from as early as the 1830s. [Song, 1923 #506, p 81] The Ang family was also linked 
to the family of Tan Kim Ching who was the Consul for the Siamese government in 
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Singapore and was also a shipowner who was said to control much of the rice trade 
from Bangkok. 
The long-term links between these Straits-born families and business interests 
in opium farming, rice milling, ship owning and the coolie trade in Penang, Saigon, 
Bangkok and Hong Kong are an intriguing area that needs much further study. Clearly 
Singapore was a nexus of links in businesses, and marriages among these families that 
cannot be ignored when trying to understand the Chinese economy of Southeast Asia. 
They help to explain the staying power of the Straits Chinese throughout the 
nineteenth century and their dominance of the Singapore and perhaps much of the 
Southeast Asian economy at the time. 
It is also clear that some of these families had built their business empires 
upon the foundations of the old water frontier and that they have been able to 
perpetuate them throughout the period of colonial rule, partly by maintaining their 
own networks, but also partly by working within the emerging colonial economy and 
by taking advantage of the opportunities which it offered them. 
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